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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL .AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
L Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence where the evidence was obtained after the 
officer, during a traffic stop, inserted his head into 
defendant's car, noticed a burnt spoon, and then obtained 
consent to search defendant's vehicle? 
CaseNo.98146&CAv 
I p'lnnly I JU, 2 
"We review the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress in .i 
bifurcated manner, reviewing its subsidiary and factual determinations under a clearly 
erroneous standard and reviewing its legal conclusions for correctness." State v. Ribe, 876 
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah App. 1994); see also State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 
1994); State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged on April 7, 1997 with one count of third-degree felony 
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), and one count of class B-misdemeanor 
possession of drug paraphernalia (R.6). Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained 
during a consensual search of defendant's vehicle (R. 16). Following an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R.43). On June 2, 1998, the drug paraphernalia 
charge was dismissed and defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to the remaining 
charge (R. 51, 64-65). The court sentenced defendant to 0-5 years in prison, but 
suspended that term and imposed a sentence of one year in jail and 36 months probation 
(R.53-54). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R.56). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 27, 1997, Utah Highway Patrol officer Mike Loveland saw defendant 
driving "over 80 miles an hour" on 1-15 in Davis County, and he pulled her over (R.67 at 
2-4). Loveland informed defendant that he had stopped her for speeding and following 
too closely behind another vehicle (R.67 at 4, 7). He asked for her license and vehicle 
registration (R.67 at 20-21). 
As defendant reached toward the vehicle's glove compartment to obtain her vehicle 
registration papers, the officer "look[ed] quite a ways inside the vehicle" and noticed a 
burnt tablespoon in the molded driver's side door compartment (R.67 at 5-6). Loveland 
acknowledged that he could not see the spoon from outside the car "without sticking my 
head in the car some" (R. 67 at 14-15). Loveland did not state any reason for inserting his 
head into the car. 
Defendant produced her license and registration (R.67 at 21). The officer asked 
defendant if any illegal substances were in the car (R.67 at 6). Defendant denied having 
any illegal substances, and the officer asked for consent to search the car (id.). Defendant 
agreed to the search, and got out of the car (R.67 at 7). The officer did not check 
defendant's license or run a warrants or other check between the time defendant produced 
her license and registration and the officer's request to search (id.). 
Loveland searched the car (id.). In addition to the burnt spoon in the driver's side 
door compartment, the officer found another burnt spoon between the driver's seat and the 
3 
center console (id.). Inside defendant's purse, Loveland found a small blue makeup kit 
(id.). The makeup kit contained a baggie with a powdery residue inside (R.67 at 7-8).l At 
that point - approximately 20 minutes after Loveland stopped defendant — the officer 
conducted field sobriety testing on defendant (R.67 at 15-16). 
Following a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court found that 
the burnt spoon in the driver's side door compartment was in plain view (R.43, 67 at 37, 
reproduced in Addendum A). The court also found that defendant voluntarily consented to 
the search leading to confiscation of the drugs and burnt spoons (R. 43, 67 at 36). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State concedes that the officer in this case engaged in an unlawful search of 
defendant's car when he inserted his head into the vehicle in the absence of probable cause 
or exigent circumstances. Although such a search might have been lawful under other 
circumstances - for example, if the officer had reasonably believed that defendant was 
dangerous and may have had access to a weapon, or if the evidence would have been 
inevitably discovered - in this case, the record does not reflect that the officer had any 
justification to place his head inside the car and visually inspect the interior. Therefore, 
his initial search of the vehicle was unlawful. 
An unlawful search does not require suppression of evidence where the defendant 
!The residue turned out to be cocaine (R.6). 
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later voluntarily consents to a subsequent search and the consent is not obtained through 
exploitation of the primary illegality. However, on the facts of this case, the consent was 
not sufficiently attenuated from the initial illegality to remove the taint of the first 
unlawful search because of (1) the close temporal proximity between the unlawful search 
and the consent, (2) the absence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the absence of a 
legitimate purpose for the illegality. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE OFFICER'S INSERTION OF HIS HEAD INTO DEFENDANT'S 
CAR WAS AN UNLAWFUL WARRANTLESS SEARCH, 
AND DEFENDANT'S SUBSEQUENT CONSENT TO A SEARCH 
OF HER CAR WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY ATTENUATED TO 
PURGE THE TAINT OF THE OFFICER'S ILLEGAL CONDUCT 
Defendant asserts that the officer conducted an unlawful search in sticking his head 
into defendant's car without a warrant, probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or 
defendant's consent. Appellant's Brief at 6. At trial, the officer admitted that he would 
not have been able to view the spoon from outside the car (R. 67 at 5-6, 14). Neither 
attorney raised or argued the issue of whether an exception to the warrant requirement was 
applicable. Nevertheless, the trial court found, without analysis, that the burnt spoon was 
in plain view (R. 43, 67 at 37). 
The State concedes that the officer's insertion of his head into the automobile 
constituted an unlawful search. See State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460,464-65 (Utah 1990) 
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(officer conducted a search when he opened a car door to view an otherwise hidden VIN 
number); see also State v. Hendricks, 948 P. 2d 740, 743 (Or. App. 1997) (officer's 
insertion of his head into defendant's truck was an unlawful search that allowed officer to 
observe what he otherwise would not have been able to observe, intruded on defendant's 
privacy interest, and exceeded the scope of the traffic stop). Under ordinary 
circumstances, a warrantless search of an automobile requires probable cause and exigent 
circumstances. See, e^g,, State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 1996). Here, the 
record does not indicate that the officer had any legitimate justification for placing his 
head in the car. 
If the officer had had reasonable concerns for his safety, he would have been 
justified in inserting his head into the vehicle. See, e.g.. State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 
1137 (Utah 1989) (officer may search a vehicle for weapons if he has a reasonable belief 
that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons); State v. 
Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 869 (Utah App. 1992) (same). However, in this case, the record 
does not indicate that the officer had any suspicions that defendant might pose a safety 
risk. 
Furthermore, although on other facts the evidence may have been admissible under 
the inevitable discovery doctrine, the record in this case does not support a theory of 
inevitable discovery. "The inevitable discovery rule allows the admission of evidence 'if 
the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information 
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ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.'" State v. Genovesi, 
909 P.2d 916, 923 n.8 (Utah App. 1995) (citation omitted). During a traffic stop, an 
officer may order the occupants of a car to exit the vehicle. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 
408, 408 (1997). Had the officer done so in this case, the spoon may well have become 
visible from outside the car. See State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 352, 357 (Utah App. 1998) 
(marijuana pipe in door pocket came into plain view after officer ordered passenger to exit 
car). However, under the inevitable discovery doctrine, "the prosecution must show that 
the evidence 'would' have been discovered, not simply that it 'could' or 'might' have been 
discovered.M Genovesi. 909 P.2d at 923 n.8 (quoting State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 242 
(Or. 1985), cert, denied Miller v. Oregon, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986)). It cannot be argued 
from the record in this case that the officer inevitably would have ordered defendant out of 
the car during this routine traffic stop, or that the spoon would then have been visible to 
the officer from a lawful vantage point. 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that the Burnt Spoon was in Plain 
View. 
MA seizure is valid under the plain view doctrine if (1) the officer is lawfully present, 
(2) the item is in plain view, and (3) the item is clearly incriminating.11 State v. Shepard, 
955 P.2d at 357. Here, the burnt spoon was not in plain view. The officer admitted that he 
was able to see the burnt spoon only because he intruded his head into defendant's car. 
"'[The officer] did not merely look into the vehicle from outside. He bent his head into the 
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car to conduct a visual inspection of what would otherwise be hidden from plain view. 
This was improper.'" State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1989) (quoting People 
v. Aquino, 500 N.Y.S. 2d 677, 679 (1986)). 
Courts have applied the plain view exception only where the challenged evidence is 
open to view from a position where the officer is lawfully entitled to be. Compare State v. 
Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1136 (holding that contraband was not visible from outside car and 
did not come into plain view until officer opened car door; therefore, its discovery did not 
come within plain view exception) with State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318, 321-22 (Utah App. 
1998) (videotaped evidence properly admitted where filming occurred from 'Vantage point 
from which other members of the public could view [defendant's] activities"). Cf State v. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d at 468 (M;When one rides in an automobile, he accepts that he himself 
and those items left uncovered on the dashboard or seat are no longer "private." In 
contrast, the driver or occupant of a vehicle who places objects under the seat, in a locked 
or unlocked glove compartment, or in a trunk does not surrender his expectation of privacy 
in those items.'" (quoting 3 Wayne R. Lafave, Search and Seizure § 7.2(b) at 33-34 
(citations omitted)). 
B. Although the Trial Court Failed to Make Findings Regarding Whether 
Defendant's Consent to the Search of Her Vehicle Was Sufficiently 
Attenuated From the Unlawful Search, the Record Does Not Reveal the 
Presence of Attenuating Factors. 
Even if an illegal search preceded defendant's consent to the search in which the 
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officer seized the burnt spoons and cocaine, exclusion of the evidence would not be 
inevitably required. In State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 690 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that a consent to search following illegal police behavior is valid if it is both 
noncoerced and not arrived at by exploitation of the primary police illegality.2 Here, 
defendant has not attacked the trial court's finding that defendant voluntarily consented to 
the search resulting in seizure of the challenged evidence.3 Appellant's Brief at 4. 
With voluntary consent established, an analysis of whether the consent was arrived 
2
 A determination of whether the consent was derived from exploitation of the 
primary illegality is commonly referred to as an attenuation analysis. See e.g.. State v. 
Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995). 
3In her motion to suppress, defendant asserted that the officer did not have 
"probable cause or exigent circumstance to detain or search the defendant or her vehicle 
or to ask for consent to search" (R. 16, 38, 41). At the motion hearing and on appeal, she 
further argued that the burnt spoon did not furnish the officer with reasonable suspicion of 
illegal drug usage (R.67 at 26-28). Appellant's Brief at 6-9. 
In arguing that the record was void of testimony that the sight of the burnt spoon 
contributed to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, defendant ignores the fact that 
the trial court itself observed the spoon, noted that it had been burned on the bottom, and 
stated that burnt spoons were regularly used in the drug culture (R.43, 67 at 37-38). The 
significance of the spoon was therefore self-evident, and the trial court did not require 
testimony to support its finding that a burnt spoon can furnish articulable suspicion to 
believe that additional evidence of drug usage exists. Although the trial court erred in 
concluding that the burnt spoon was in plain view, the spoon would have furnished 
reasonable suspicion supporting continued detention of defendant if it had been within the 
lawful view of the officer. 
To the extent defendant maintains that the officer's request to search exceeded the 
scope of the traffic stop, her contention finds support in this Court's previous holdings. 
See State v. Ziegleman, 905 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah App. 1995) (officer's questions 
regarding whether defendant had weapons or drugs in his car exceeded permissible scope 
of stop); State v. Castnen 825 P.2d 699, 703 (Utah App. 1992) (officer's request to view 
VIN number inside vehicle door exceeded scope of stop). 
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at by exploitation of the primary illegality is appropriate. See, e.g.. State v. 
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995). The attenuation analysis involves 
consideration of three factors: (1) the temporal proximity of the primary illegality and the 
granting of consent, (2) the presence or absence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the 
purpose and flagrancy of the illegal police conduct. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-91 n.4 (citing 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975)). 
In this case, the time between the officer's initial visual inspection of the interior of 
defendant's car and defendant's consent to a search was brief, and no intervening 
circumstances were present. Furthermore, the record does not indicate that the officer's 
conduct had a legitimate purpose. Therefore, under Arroyo, defendant's subsequent 
consent to search was not sufficiently attenuated from the officer's initial intrusion into the 
car to be constitutionally valid. Compare State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 705 (Utah App. 
1992) (defendant voluntarily extended encounter with officer after he was no longer 
detained in traffic stop; thus, intervening circumstances separated officer's illegal search 
for VIN from defendant's consent to search of vehicle).4 
4Other cases finding sufficient attenuation between consent to search or confession 
and a prior illegal act include State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1273-74 (Utah 1993) 
(consent to search storage facility sufficiently attenuated from officers' illegal entry into 
apartment where consent not coerced, Miranda rights explained, written and verbal 
consent given five hours after illegal entry, and officers who believed defendant was 
armed with explosives had safety purpose in entering illegally); and State v. Allen, 839 
P.2d 291, 301 (Utah 1992) (confession sufficiently attenuated from arguably unlawful 
arrest where Miranda warnings given, confession occurred a day and a half after arrest, 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State concedes that it was error for the trial court to 
admit evidence obtained as a result of Officer Loveland's search of defendant's vehicle. 
Therefore, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the lower court's denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress and remand the case for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ID day of fl/)<ojuu^ , 
1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
O^dk^jLAAOJ^i 4 O / W M A 
CATHERINE M. JOHNSON 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
and officers believed they were in hot pursuit of felon). 
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ADDENDim 
35 
COMING UP WITH A ARTICULABLE SUSPICION. 
THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: COURT WILL MAKE THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS 
AND RULING IN THIS CASE: THAT THERE'S NO CONFLICT IN 
TESTIMONY THAT ON FEBRUARY 27, 1997, TROOPER LOVELAND WAS ON 
1-15 ABOUT ONE MILE OR THREE-QUARTERS OF A MILE NORTH OF 
SHEPARD'S LANE. OR YEAH, NORTH OF -- OR SOUTH OF SHEPARD'S 
LANE, I GUESS. IT WOULD BE THE INTERCHANGE PRIOR TO THE BURKE 
INTERCHANGE, SO THAT YOU WERE NORTH OF THE BURKE INTERCHANGE. 
MR. LOVELAND: WELL, I'VE WORKED ALL OVER. I 
APOLOGIZE, I'M NOT REAL FAMILIAR WITH ALL THE DETAILS. 
THE COURT: IT'S NORTH OF THE BURKE INTERCHANGE, IS 
THE ONE THAT IS -- THE ONE YOU TAKE OFF. I THINK THAT'S WHERE 
THE JUVENILE COURT IS IN FARMINGTON. 
HE INDICATED THAT HE VISUALLY OBSERVED THE DEFENDANT'S 
VEHICLE, WHICH HE ESTIMATED A HIGH RATE OF SPEED, OVER 
80 MILES PER HOUR. THE CAR WENT PAST HIS LOCATION. HE TRIED 
TO GET THE VEHICLE ON RADAR. WASN'T ABLE TO DO THAT. PULLED 
OUT, FOLLOWED THE VEHICLE, OBSERVED THE VEHICLE FOLLOWING THE 
VEHICLE IN FRONT TOO CLOSELY WITHIN ONE CAR LENGTH AT THAT 
SPEED. INITIATED HIS LIGHTS AND THE DEFENDANT PULLED OFF THE 
BURKE OFF-RAMP. INITIATED A TRAFFIC STOP. 
AT THIS POINT THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL DISAGREEMENT IN 
TESTIMONY OF WHAT HAPPENED FOLLOWING THAT. RULING IN THIS, 
THE COURT HAS TO WEIGH THE EVIDENCE AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE 
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WITNESSES AND DETERMINE WHICH VERSION THE COURT WILL ACCEPT. 
IN THIS CASE, THE COURT IS GOING TO ACCEPT AND VIEW AS MORE 
CREDIBLE THE TESTIMONY OF THE OFFICER. HIS VERSION OF THE 
EVENTS THAT TOOK PLACE. HE INDICATED THAT HE APPROACHED THE 
DRIVER. SHE APPEARED NERVOUS. HE ASKED FOR HER REGISTRATION 
AND DRIVER'S LICENSE. TOLD HER WHY THE STOP, FOR SPEEDING. 
AS SHE REACHED OVER TO -- HIS TESTIMONY WAS IS SHE REACHED 
OVER TO GET HER REGISTRATION, THAT HIS HEAD PARTIALLY IN THE 
DRIVER'S SIDE WINDOW. HE LOOKED DOWN AND IN THAT SAW A SPOON 
WHICH HAD -- APPEARED ON THE BOTTOM BURNT MATERIAL. AT THAT 
TIME, HE BECAME SUSPICIOUS THAT IT MAY BE A SPOON USED IN 
CONSUMPTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
HE ASKED THE DEFENDANT WHETHER THERE WAS ANY CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE. SHE INDICATED NO, THERE WAS NO CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE IN THE VEHICLE. HE ASKED CONSENT TO SEARCH THAT 
POINT. SHE INDICATED THAT -- AND HE INDICATED THAT -- THE 
RESPONSE WAS THAT SHE WOULDN'T FIND ANYTHING AND CONSENTED TO 
SEARCH. THERE WAS A SEARCH AT THAT TIME, DURING WHICH TIME HE 
THEN FOUND A SECOND SPOON. THE FIRST SPOON HE FOUND WITH THE 
BURNT. FOUND A SECOND SPOON BETWEEN THE CONSOLE AND THE 
DRIVER'S SEAT, WHICH ALSO HAD SOME BURNT MATERIAL ON THE 
BOTTOM. 
BASED UPON THAT, HE THEN FURTHER SEARCHED HER PURSE. AND 
IN A MAKEUP KIT FOUND A BAGGIE WITH A WHITE POWDERY SUBSTANCE 
THAT LATER TESTED AS CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE COCAINE. 
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I THINK THE ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT BASED ON THAT FIRST 
IS THAT WERE THERE SUFFICIENT CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE TRAFFIC 
STOP. THE COURT BELIEVES THAT THE VISUAL SPEED, GIVEN THE 
OFFICER'S TRAINING, PRIOR TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE OF MAKING 
VISUAL STOPS, WOULD CREATE A -- THE NECESSARY PROBABLE CAUSE 
FOR A TRAFFIC STOP. AND ALSO THE FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE. 
THE ISSUE I THINK BEFORE THE COURT IS WHERE -- WHETHER 
THAT SPOON WAS IN PLAIN VIEW. IF IT'S IN PLAIN VIEW, YOU CAN 
OBSERVE AND ASK QUESTIONS. 
BASED ON THE TESTIMONY, THE COURT WILL FIND THAT HE 
OBSERVED THE SPOON DURING THE INITIAL -- WITHIN FIRST MINUTE 
OF THE TRAFFIC STOP WHEN THEY ASKED FOR THE REGISTRATION. 
THAT IT WAS IN PLAIN VIEW ON THE DRIVER'S SIDE. 
STATE'S EXHIBIT 1 HAS BEEN ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE. THE 
COURT HAS THE ABILITY TO VIEW THE SPOON. THE SPOON DOES HAVE 
ON THE BOTTOM SUBSTANTIAL BLACK TARNISH WHICH INDICATES THAT 
IT HAS BEEN BURNED ON THE BOTTOM OF THE SPOON, WHICH IS A 
REGULAR USE AS FAR AS IN DRUG CULTURE, THAT IT IS -- AND THAT 
THE SPOON DOES HAVE SUBSTANTIAL BURNT THAT IS -- THAT IS NOT A 
NORMAL SPOON THAT'S IN -- IN SOMEBODY'S DRAWER USUALLY DOESN'T 
HAVE BURNT MARKINGS ON THE BOTTOM. THAT WHEN HE FOUND THE 
SECOND SPOON, THAT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONTINUE TO 
SEARCH. 
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT BASED ON THE FACTS THAT THERE 
WASN'T UNDUE DELAY, THAT THERE WAS AN ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO 
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ASK ONCE THE SPOON WITH THE BURNT MATERIAL HAD BEEN FOUND ON 
THE BOTTOM, THAT IT WAS A VOLUNTARY CONSENT, UPON FINDING THE 
SECOND SPOON THAT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONTINUE THE 
SEARCH. ON THAT BASIS, THE COURT WILL FIND THAT THERE IS NOT 
A GROUNDS TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE AND WOULD ALLOW THE SPOONS 
AND THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN EVIDENCE. 
MR. BUCHER: I'LL PREPARE SOMETHING. WE NEED NOW A 
NON JURY TRIAL DATE, AND I ALSO HAVE ANOTHER MOTION THAT CAN 
BE ARGUED AT THE SAME TIME AS THE TRIAL DATE IF IT'S A NON 
JURY ONE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. I NEED TO GET MY CALENDAR. IT 
WAS JUST PUT ON MY DESK. ALSO, CAN YOU GET THE NEXT FILE --
THE CLERK: YES. 
THE COURT: LOOKS LIKE THEY'RE ALSO --DO YOU WANT 
TO WITHDRAW THE EVIDENCE? 
MR. MAJOR: WE WOULD, YOUR HONOR, RETURN IT TO THE 
OFFICER. 
MR. BUCHER: I'D LIKE IT TO BE MADE AVAILABLE, HIM 
KEEP IT IN HIS CUSTODY SO IT WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR 
LATER --
MR. MAJOR: WE'LL DO THAT, YOUR HONOR. OFFICER WILL 
MAINTAIN IT, PART OF THE CHAIN. 
THE COURT: HOW QUICKLY DO YOU WANT THIS SET? 
MR. BUCHER: I'VE MADE A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK 
OF A SPEEDY PROSECUTION, SO I CAN'T SAY I DON'T WANT IT SET --
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This matter comes before the Court for Hearing on Motion to Suppress. Steven 
Major is present as counsel for the State of Utah. The defendant is present and represented 
by John R. Bucher. 
Trooper Loveland is sworn and testifies. 
The State rests. 
Wilhelimina Lotte is sworn and testifies. 
Defendant's Exhibit 1 is offered and received. 
The Defendant rests. 
The Court finds Trooper Loveland had probable cause to stop the defendant for 
speeding and following too close. The Court finds the evidence, the spoon, were in plain 
view. The spoon had been burned, which is a regular use in the drug culture. The Court 
doesn't find there was undue delay. There was a voluntary search. After searching, Trooper 
Loveland found the second spoon and the controlled substance. The court denies the motion 
to suppress. 
Mr. Bucher will prepare an order. Mr. Bucher would request a non-jury trial be set. 
The defendant personally waives her right to jury trial. 
The Court will set this matter for non-jury trial on May 8, W% at 9:00 a.m. The plea 
<s> 
cutoff date is May 4, 1998 
Defendant's Exhibit 2 is withdrawn by the State. 
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